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Abstract
Political economy and economic sociology have developed in relative isolation from 
each other. While political economy focuses largely on macrophenomena, economic 
sociology focuses on the level of social interaction in the economy. The paper argues 
that economic sociology can provide a microfoundation of political economy beyond 
rational actor theory and behavioral economics. Based on a discussion of what I call the 
four Cs of capitalism (credit, commodification, creativity, and competition), I argue that 
macroeconomic outcomes depend on the “contingent expectations” actors have in de­
cision situations. Expectations are based on the indeterminate and therefore contingent 
interpretation of the situations actors face. This shifts attention to the “management of 
expectations” as a crucial element of economic activity and to the institutional, political, 
and cultural foundations of expectations. The dynamics of capitalist development are 
precarious because they hinge on the creation of expectations conducive to economic 
growth.
Zusammenfassung
Politische Ökonomie und Wirtschaftssoziologie haben sich relativ isoliert voneinander 
entwickelt. Während die Politische Ökonomie vornehmlich Makrophänomene unter­
sucht, konzentriert sich die Wirtschaftssoziologie zumeist auf die Ebene der sozialen 
Interaktion in der Wirtschaft. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass die Wirtschaftssoziologie Grund­
lagen für eine Mikrofundierung der Politischen Ökonomie jenseits der Theorie ratio­
nalen Handelns und behavioristischer Theorien bietet. Ausgehend von der Diskussion 
vier zentraler Elemente kapitalistischer Ökonomie, die ich als the four Cs of capitalism 
bezeichne (credit, commodification, creativity, and competition), zeige ich, dass makro­
ökonomische Resultate auf den „kontingenten Erwartungen“ der Akteure in der Hand­
lungssituation beruhen. Erwartungen gründen auf den unbestimmten und daher kon­
tingenten Interpretationen der Handlungssituation, mit der die Akteure konfrontiert 
sind. Dies lenkt die Aufmerksamkeit auf das „Erwartungsmanagement“ als zentrales 
Element wirtschaftlichen Handelns und zu den institutionellen, politischen und kul­
turellen Grundlagen von Erwartungen. Die Dynamik kapitalistischer Entwicklung ist 
immer prekär, weil sie von der Schaffung von Erwartungen abhängt, die Wachstum be­
fördern.
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Capitalism as a System of Contingent Expectations:  
Toward a Sociological Microfoundation of Political Economy
The economy has long ceased to be the exclusive domain of economists. Political econ-
omy and economic sociology have both become important subfields in their respective 
academic disciplines over the past two decades, bringing the economy into the focus of 
political science and sociology. 
Although both subfields share important premises, they have developed in relative iso-
lation from each other. Research in political economy focuses on the varieties of capi-
talism and on the transformation of the institutional configurations of contemporary 
capitalism in the process of economic liberalization. Researchers are interested primar-
ily in the explanation of macroeconomic outcomes, such as economic growth rates, in-
flation rates, aggregated demand, changes in the sector-composition of the economy, or 
accumulation crises (Boyer 2004; Hall/Soskice 2001; Thelen/Mahoney 2010). Econom-
ic sociology, by contrast, focuses on the “embeddedness” of economic action, show-
ing in often meticulous case studies how economic outcomes depend on the structure 
of social networks, institutional configurations, and cultural contexts (Dobbin 2004; 
Smelser/Swedberg 2005; Granovetter 1985). 
At first glance, this disconnection of the two subfields seems to become even more pro-
nounced with the recent move in political economy to shift interest from the varieties 
of capitalism to the “commonalities of capitalism” (Streeck 2011). With this shift, politi-
cal economy starts to abstract from historically specific institutional contexts and their 
complementarities and focuses interest on the general logics of capitalist reproduction.1
Contrary to the initial assumption of a further divide between political economy and 
economic sociology I argue that the shift towards the investigation of the commonali-
ties of capitalism opens up avenues for a closer alignment of the two subfields. This 
holds true because economic sociology, with its focus on the micro and meso levels of 
analysis, offers a complementary perspective to political economy by providing a foun-
dation for understanding the dynamics of capitalism from the actor perspective. 
I would like to thank Christoph Deutschmann, Timur Ergen, Ted Fischer, and Wolfgang Streeck for 
helpful comments on a previous version of the article.
1 For this shift see also Sewell (2008) and Kocka (2010). In economic sociology, the notion of 
capitalism is seldom used. Exceptions are the two volumes edited by Nee and Swedberg (2005, 
2007). Interest in macroeconomic development has increased in economic sociology in recent 
years, motivated by the recent financial crisis and the “great recession” (Krippner 2011).
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While the strength of political economy has been the focus of the institutionalist ex-
planation of macroeconomic outcomes, including social structures such as inequality 
and skill distribution, its underdeveloped part has been the lack of a microfoundation 
explaining the concrete processes underlying the observed changes on the macro level. 
For the most part, political economists have either rejected the need for a microfounda-
tion (Thelen/Steinmo 1992) or have made use of rational actor theory (Hall/Soskice 
2001). Although some of the more recent accounts by political economists show in-
creased interest in interpretive action theories (Blyth 2010; Nelson/Katzenstein 2010; 
Streeck/Thelen 2005; Thelen/Mahoney 2010) developed mostly in sociology, these have 
not been systematically integrated into the analysis of the dynamics of capitalism.
I follow the work done in the field of economic sociology and pursue a distinctively mi-
cro perspective. By micro perspective I mean an analysis of the economy from the per-
spective of actors and their cultural, social, and political contexts, with a particular eye 
to the decision problems they confront. However, in contrast to most work being done 
in the new economic sociology, I will apply this perspective to an analysis of the dynam-
ics of capitalism. How does capitalism operate, when considered from the perspective 
of the social interactions of the actors who are enacting, reproducing, and changing 
the economic system through their decisions? What are the connections between these 
social interactions and the macrophenomena that are the focus of political economy? 
To understand the “expansive dynamism of capitalism” (Sewell 2008: 522) one needs 
an understanding of the micro processes underlying macro outcomes (Deutschmann 
2009). My main thesis is that capitalism, looked at from the perspective of social in-
teraction, can be analyzed as a system of contingent expectations. It is on the basis of 
expectations that economic activities are pursued or abstained from. Under conditions 
of uncertainty, expectations and the decisions based on them are not determined by 
objective conditions but rather are the outcome of actors’ interpretations of the situa-
tion in the context of prevailing institutional structures, cultural templates, and social 
networks. The notion of contingent expectations expresses that the “future is an ambigu-
ous canvas capable of multiple interpretations” (DiMaggio 2002: 90).
For capitalist economies to operate, societies must succeed in inducing expectations in 
actors that motivate them to engage in the activities on which growth is based. Hence 
the dynamics of capitalism can be analyzed as based on the fluctuations of expectations 
in a world characterized by uncertainties. As a consequence, the development of the 
economy depends crucially on the management of expectations; motivating the deci-
sions of economic actors by shaping their expectations and by shaping the social and 
political structures underlying these expectations, becomes one of the main tasks of 
political regulators and a major goal of speech acts uttered in the field of the economy. 
I will start by briefly defining capitalism and identify four different elements that make 
up the main activities underlying the dynamics of capitalism: credit, commodification, 
innovation, and competition. Following this I will discuss each of the four elements 
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separately, showing the role of expectations in their operations. In their historical devel-
opment, capitalist societies succeeded increasingly in the development of institutional 
and cultural capacities which allowed for the unfolding of expectational structures con-
ducive to the expansion of the four elements to be discussed. At the same time, the 
economy also became more fragile because of enlarged interdependencies in an in-
creasingly global economic system and the associated expansion of cognitive demands. 
In the conclusion I will argue that the perspective developed provides the basis for a 
microfoundation for understanding the dynamics of capitalist economies, which offers 
an alternative to rational actor theory and behavioral economics. 
1 The four Cs of capitalism
What is capitalism? Capitalism can be defined as an endemically dynamic economic 
system in which the production of goods and services is motivated by expected profits, 
materializing in market exchange. What distinguishes capitalism from all other eco-
nomic systems is its need to grow – it can stabilize itself only by continuously under-
mining its own historical forms in the relentless search for new profit opportunities. 
The capitalist economy can never be in equilibrium, but remains always in a “dynamic 
disequilibrium” (Beckert 2009). In the analysis of capitalism the explanation of this 
restlessness stands at the center. While the issue can be addressed in highly abstract 
form by analyzing the processes of capital accumulation, the more telling matters for 
examination are found on a less abstract level: through what elements does capitalism 
produce its continuous dynamics, which has led to unprecedented growth over the past 
200 years but also recurrently to sharp economic crises? To address this question I take 
up – and amend – a categorization recently introduced by Wolfgang Streeck (2012) 
which distinguishes between four core elements underlying the expansiveness of capi-
talism: credit, commodification, creativity, and competition. 2 These elements I call the 
four Cs of capitalism.
Credit stimulates economic activity by providing purchasing power in the present based 
on the expectation that the loan can be repaid by the debtor through his surplus pro-
duction in the future. Commodification provides the “raw material” for capitalist expan-
sion by turning goods and services into tradable products that are produced to generate 
2 This categorization is in principle open to further elements. Two possible candidates would 
be property rights and social class. Theories of capitalism usually emphasize the crucial role 
of property rights (North 1990; Richter/Furubotn 2003) for the development of capitalism 
(Collins 1980). While I follow the claim of the importance of property rights I maintain that 
they take a derived place by being necessary conditions for the expansion of credit, innovation, 
competition, and commodification. Social class comes in as an important element of the opera-
tion of the elements discussed. The Marxist tradition of defining class relations in capitalism 
through the commodification of labor is included under the heading of commodification. 
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profits on markets. Creativity, i.e. innovation, stimulates economic dynamics through 
the invention of new products and efficiency gains. Competition forces suppliers to seek 
gains in efficiency in order not to be swept from the market by other producers. 
The four elements all relate to market processes. They are interdependent and only in 
combination do they produce the dynamic restlessness of the capitalist order. Innova-
tion is a means of coping with competition and leads to new commodities. Competi-
tion motivates innovation but also commodification. One form of innovation is to put 
new products into the market. Innovation depends on credit to secure the means to 
cover costs in the innovation process which will only later be recovered through the 
sales of the product. The extension of credit relations creates capital for innovation 
and investments fostering commodification processes. The interdependencies between 
the four Cs of capitalism are multifaceted. But nevertheless it is useful to distinguish 
between them analytically.
Bringing the four Cs of capitalism to the forefront of an analysis of capitalism does not 
imply that they would appear only in capitalism or even only in contemporary capital-
ism. Rather we can understand capitalism as a system which unfolds through the expan-
sion of the four elements:3 the development of modern credit and monetary systems, to-
gether with the emergence of institutional trust devices that provide the foundation for 
the expansion of credit (Carruthers/Ariovich 2010; Graeber 2011; Ferguson 2008); the 
increasing commodification of the provision of goods and services, especially through 
the emergence of labor markets, the receding of subsistence economies, and the emer-
gence of a consumer society since the eighteenth century (Marx [1867]1977; Campbell 
1987); the systematic expansion of innovative activities through the application of ra-
tional science to the production process (Baumol 2002; Landes 1969); and finally the 
creation of competitive markets through the provision of infrastructures facilitating the 
exchange of commodities – first at a national, later at a global level –, the introduction 
of standards, and the institutionalization of freedom of trade, including the banning of 
guilds and other protectionist measures (Braudel [1979]1985; Fligstein 2001).
Making the four Cs of capitalism the cornerstone of analysis mirrors approaches in 
political economy analyzing the financial system, processes of “land grabbing,” com-
petition regimes, and innovation systems. However, unlike these macro oriented ap-
proaches, mine focuses on the level of social interaction, concentrating on the creation 
(and destruction) of actors’ expectations which are necessary for these elements to op-
erate in a manner conducive to the dynamic reproduction of the system.
3 By highlighting the four elements I am not aiming at a theory of the origins of capitalism and 
its different forms. My only claim is that the dynamics of capitalism operates through the four 
elements identified and that they have increased in scope in the course of modern capitalism’s 
development.
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Credit
Credit is undoubtedly one of the main elements of capitalist economic growth. “With-
out the foundation of borrowing and lending, the economic history of our world would 
scarcely have got off the ground” (Ferguson 2008: 31). Credit as a form of social re-
lationship can be traced back 5000 years in history (Graeber 2011), but in no other 
system did it have the scope it has in modern capitalism. Schumpeter (1912: 95ff) even 
defined capitalism as a system of indebtedness.4 Through credit an actor obtains pur-
chasing power in the present against a promise – the promise to repay the loan at a 
specified point in time, together with an additional sum called interest. The fact that 
credit becomes available only against interest means that it must be utilized to produce 
a surplus. Hence credit relations put pressure on the economic system to expand. 
Viewed from the actor level, for credit relations to come into existence, the creditor 
must hold the expectation that he will be repaid the sum of money and the agreed upon 
interest at the point in time stipulated in the contract. That this expectation stands at 
the center of credit relations can be seen etymologically. The term “credit” stems from 
the Latin “credere,” meaning “to believe.” The “belief” consists in the expectation that 
the debtor will repay the loan. Hence credit relations are anchored in the credibility of 
the borrower’s promise to repay the loan, which has its basis in an assessment of the 
debtor’s trustworthiness (see also Carruthers/Stinchcombe 1999). Credit is essentially a 
relationship of trust and confidence.5
The central role of trust extends to the monetary system as such. “[T]he value of a unit 
of currency is not the measure of the value of an object, but the measure of one’s trust 
in other human beings” (Graeber 2011: 47). It is not incidental that banknotes were 
originally called “promissory notes.” The acceptance of money, which as such is worth-
less, is based on the contingent expectation that everybody else will accept the pieces 
of paper as payment (Ganßmann 2011). Trust is conferred in the promise of the issuer 
of the money – today the state or its central bank – that he will not increase monetary 
supply at a rate which leads to the devaluation of the money through inflation.6
4 Credit allows entrepreneurs access to economic goods before they have a “normal claim” to 
them. “It temporarily substitutes, as it were, a fiction of this claim for the claim itself” (Schum-
peter 1912: 107).
5 The difference between the two concepts I see as follows: trust is demarcating a situation in 
which the other party may take the deliberate decision to damage me for his own benefit. Con-
fidence is a situation in which I engage in incalculable risks which emerge from the openness 
of the future which is unforeseeable for both parties. Fraud would be a breach of trust. The 
expectation, say, that Goldman Sachs will stay in business is an expression of confidence.
6 In a monetary system in which paper money is covered by a commodity – mostly gold – the 
promise is that the issuer will redeem the bill against a certain amount of the commodity. Ef-
fectively this was to make credible the promise of the issuer of paper money that he will not 
increase the money supply at a rate which will devalue the currency. 
6 MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/4
What makes credit and money so interesting from a sociological perspective is that the 
expectation that a debtor – whether a private person, an organization or the state – will 
indeed live up to the promise to repay the loan can never be rationally calculated be-
cause the future cannot be foreseen. Since the ability and willingness of the debtor to 
repay the loan are ultimately uncertain, the expectations of creditors and hence their 
willingness to give credit are dependent on interpretation.7 Viewed from the macro 
perspective, the trust entailed in credit is justified only if the economy grows and repay-
ment of the credit can be enforced. Viewed from the actor level, the promise to repay a 
loan depends on the debtor being able to utilize the production factors purchased with 
the loan in a way that he makes a profit from selling the products at a later point in time. 
“If the expectations are not sufficiently fulfilled the whole system becomes destabilized” 
(Ganßmann 2011: 14). 
The uncertainty entailed in the expectations regarding the risks involved in credit holds 
also for the operation of the monetary system. Philip Mirowski has called the assump-
tion that the value of money will not have deteriorated at the point in time when the 
holder wants to use it for the purchase of goods a “working fiction of a monetary in-
variant” (Mirowski 1991: 581). It is a fiction because monetary stability depends on the 
actual commitment of central banks to low inflation (Ingham 2004: 31), on banking 
regulation, and on macroeconomic development in the future (Ganßmann 2012: 231f), 
all of which are uncertain. As the history of monetary crises shows, the devaluation of 
money is a recurrent phenomenon. Nevertheless, in a money economy actors must act 
as if the value of money were invariant in order to accept money as means of payment 
and to abstain from wage and price increases in anticipation of inflation. Because the 
future is open, the expectation of the stability of money cannot be justified on calcula-
tive grounds and requires, as Georg Simmel argued, an element of “supra-theoretical 
belief” or “social-psychological quasi-religious faith” (Simmel [1907]1978: 179, quoted 
from Ingham 2004: 65).
Therefore, if capitalist expansion depends on credit, societies must succeed in creating 
the expectation in capital owners that the promise entailed in the credit relation will 
indeed be honored. On the side of debtors the expansion of credit relations presup-
poses the willingness of potential actors to become indebted to improve their mon-
etary wealth in the future. This can also not be taken for granted: borrowing money 
for investment has a social precondition in a life-plan of individuals which is directed 
towards the future and entails the willingness to engage in risks and speculation to 
increase one’s wealth (Deutschmann 2009: 32). Once a person is indebted – be it for 
investment or for consumption purposes – credit has a disciplinary effect by pressuring 
the debtor to act in ways conducive to his ability to repay the loan together with interest 
(Calder 1999). Through this pressure, credit itself has a motivational effect relevant for 
capitalist growth.
7  See also Prato/Stark (2012) for the role of interpretation in the valuation of financial assets. 
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Viewed from a historical perspective the ability to expand credit relations by expanding 
expectations of trustworthiness has been one of the most important – but often un-
noticed – preconditions for the unfolding of capitalism. How was this unprecedented 
expansion of trust achieved? The foundations of trust in credit are social in character. 
They can be cultural as in, for instance, the prevalence of a shared universalistic ethic 
(Weber [1930]1992), a commitment to rules of conduct on the part of the “respectable 
merchant” (Braudel [1979]1985), or classification schemes that seek to guide expec-
tations (Carruthers/Stinchcombe 1999: 356).8 They can be based on social networks, 
as they are, for instance, in ethnic communities (Portes/Sensenbrenner 1993). For the 
most part, however, they are institutional: they are based on the existence of a legal 
system able to effectively enforce property rights (North 1990), on accounting laws, 
bankruptcy laws (Halliday/Carruthers 2009), the risk regulation of banks, and on laws 
on the independence of the central bank. These are all institutional devices aimed at 
supporting the trust and trustworthiness of actors in the credit system. Without them, 
the expansion of credit relations over the past 200 years would have been impossible.
However, the institutional safeguards have not led to the vanishing of uncertainty in 
credit relations. The vulnerability of creditors has two sources: fraud and unpredict-
ability. Despite institutional safeguards, malfeasance remains a threat to creditors, as 
can be seen from spectacular instances of fraud, such as the bankruptcy of Enron or the 
Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff. Because institutional structures made possible 
new forms of risk taking associated with profit opportunities, but also with increased 
opportunities for fraud, the contingency of expectations regarding the repayment of 
credit has remained.9
The second source of vulnerability is the unpredictability of the debtor’s economic suc-
cess. Debtors may be fully committed to repaying their loan, but the market may turn 
against them with the consequence that they are unable to repay their debt. Due to 
uncertainty, future economic development cannot be foreseen, either by debtors or by 
investors. Credit decisions, like any other investment decision, are therefore based on 
what John Maynard Keynes called the state of confidence. This, however, is nothing 
but the contingent expectations of economic actors regarding the economic outlook 
and debtors’ creditworthiness. If entrepreneurs have pessimistic expectations regarding 
the economic outlook they will reduce their borrowing. At the same time, the owners 
of financial wealth will develop a preference for liquidity and charge higher interest to 
debtors in precisely those situations in which firms or the state need additional liquidity 
8 Since the functioning of institutions also depends on the “good will” of those regulated by the 
institutions, moral resources may be an indispensable factor in the possibility of capitalist dy-
namics (Streeck 2006: 17). 
9 The willingness to give credit also depends, of course, on the interest rate. But it would be short-
sighted to see the expansion of credit only as a function of the interest rate, as can be seen in 
economic crises when even interest rates close to zero do not lead to an increase in lending. Cf. 
Keynes ([1936]1964).
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(Keynes [1936]1964). By withholding capital from its employment in the production 
process, economic output is reduced. Expectations determine the level of investment 
and lie at the root of business cycles and financial bubbles. 
The current financial and economic crisis provides ample evidence of the role of con-
tingent expectations in macroeconomic development. The expansion of credit in the 
American housing market – as well as some European housing markets, such as the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain – was based on the “fictional expectation” (Beckert 
2011a) of ever-increasing housing prices which would have made it possible for home 
owners to repay their mortgages. Only based on this shared expectation did banks and 
borrowers see a benefit in the expansion of credit. However, even if investors and bor-
rowers do not share the same expectation regarding market outlook, the contingency 
of expectations can still open up room for the extension of credit. If credit risks can be 
sold on a secondary market – for instance, on the market for collateralized debt obliga-
tions – it is not the expectation of the creditor regarding the risk of the debtor that is 
relevant but the expectation of the party to whom the debt is subsequently sold. Hence 
what is relevant for the investment decision is market opinion (Keynes [1936]1964). 
Even if an individual investor holds the belief that an asset is overpriced, he may stay in 
the market because he assumes “that he will be first in line when the borrower gets into 
difficulties and a run takes place” (Hellwig 1998: 718). This type of (over-)confidence 
lies at the root of market bubbles.
Since investments are not only risky but also a source of profit and because expectations 
concerning a debtor’s ability to repay his loan are contingent, the management of confi-
dence must become a prime activity in the economy (see Figure 1). Through “impression 
management” (Goffman 1959) trust-takers try to signal their trustworthiness (Beckert 
2005; Bacharach/Gambetta 2001). The debtor (trust-taker) will attempt to convince po-
tential creditors of the prudence of investing in his business. Through signals he will at-
tempt to convince the trust-giver of his honesty and demonstrate the soundness of his 
business. In this sense enterprise “depends on hopes” (Keynes [1936]1964: 162). Seen 
from the side of the investor (trust-giver) in search of profitable investment opportuni-
ties, he must convince himself – or his principals – of the potential profitability of the 
deal. For this he needs to interpret the signals provided by the debtor and the market. 
Rating agencies and credit scoring systems (Hiss/Rona-Tas 2011) are intermediaries 
in financial markets whose function it is to interpret the debtors’ signals to assess their 
creditworthiness. They thereby serve to stabilize investors’ expectations and can be used 
to influence expectations. 
The management of confidence regarding creditworthiness can also proceed from the 
creditor. A creditor already holding debt from a debtor will attempt to downplay any 
problems of the debtor to avoid market depreciation of his assets by influencing the 
expectations of other investors while perhaps already looking for an exit strategy.10 On 
10 When S&P downgraded American government debt in the summer of 2011 Warren Buffet went 
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the other hand, assessment of a debtor’s creditworthiness can be deliberately cast into 
doubt by investors speculating on his default.11 If expectations are themselves a source 
of profits or losses the management of confidence becomes a crucial element of capital-
ist production. 
Depending on a debtor’s need for credit, the management of confidence can become 
a power game in which capital owners force the trust-taker to comply with their con-
ditions. Creditors exercise “voice” by threatening “exit.” This argument was made as 
early as the 1930s by Keynes: “[E]conomic prosperity is excessively dependent on a po-
litical and social atmosphere which is congenial to the average business man” (Keynes 
[1936]1964: 162). A few years later, Polish economist Michal Kalecki took up this argu-
ment, giving it a much more political twist: if employment levels depend on the state 
of confidence, this “gives to the capitalists a powerful indirect control over Government 
policy: everything which may shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided 
because it would cause economic crisis” (Kalecki 1943: 325). 
on TV to show his conviction that American debt is fully secure for investors. Incidentally, the 
holding firm Berkshire Hathaway, of which Warren Buffet is the CEO, owns 40 billion dollars in 
US government debt.
11 A prominent example is the statement made by former Deutsche Bank CEO Rolf Breuer who, 
in 2002, publicly spread doubt concerning the creditworthiness of German media mogul Leo 
Kirch. Kirch had to declare bankruptcy shortly afterwards and sued Deutsche Bank for damage 
compensation. The lawsuit is still ongoing. 
Figure 1 The four Cs of capitalism
Management of 
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arrangements (examples)
Credit Management of 
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 – Legal system
 – Social networks
 – Power
Commodification Management of value Belief in performance  
of good
 – Private property rights
 – Legitimation of profit-
oriented exchanges
 – Classification of goods
Creativity  
(Innovation)
Management of 
imaginaries 
Belief in imaginary  – Stories and myths
 – Social inequality
 – Legitimation of success-
seeking through risk 
taking
 – Social networks
Competition Management of 
expectations regarding 
others’ decisions
Belief in strategy 
outcome
 – Stories
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 – Power
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The current sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone provides ample evidence of this: in 
order not to lose the confidence of the financial markets, the governments of eurozone 
countries provided guarantees for the debt of those countries that have lost that con-
fidence on condition that these countries comply with fierce austerity measures which 
are cutting living standards and causing recessions. These policies satisfy the interest 
of financial investors in having their loans repaid. Financial investors communicate 
their interests by threatening to remove trust in the debtors – that is, to exit – effectively 
threatening them with unsustainable interest rates for further loans or even blocking 
their access to capital markets. This power struggle is illustrated when rating agencies 
downgrade sovereign debt. Acting essentially on behalf of financial investors, they com-
municate investors’ demands to governments by forming expectations. 
Commodification
By commodification I refer to the transformation of goods and services into commodities, 
a process centrally connected to the development of modern capitalism. Precapitalist 
economies were dominated by householding and traditional forms of reciprocity within 
community networks (Braudel [1979]1985; Polanyi [1944]1957). With the unfolding 
of capitalism they were transformed into economies dominated by exchange relations. 
Commodification is an important element of economic expansion because commodi-
ties are the basis for profit-making. Commodification can proliferate firstly through 
geographic expansion when more regions and countries are included in the system of 
market exchanges. Expansion can take place, secondly, when products and services hith-
erto provided in non-commodified form come to be traded on markets.12 Thirdly, com-
modification takes place through newly developed products entering the market. Finally, 
commodification can unfold in the time dimension through futures markets.13
To become commodities, goods must be exchangeable on markets and a monetary sys-
tem must be in place as a universal measuring device, allowing for the emergence of 
prices. In addition, goods must be considered legitimate objects of exchange and their 
qualities must be recognized and valued. Only if actors expect utility from their posses-
sion are they willing to “sacrifice” money to purchase them. Viewed from the perspec-
tive of the buyer, a commodity is an object “which promises performance” (Shackle 
1972). This performance, however, depends on contingent expectations held by the 
12 For the development of capitalism the most important commodification process is that of labor.
13 I am not claiming that commodification is a unidirectional and uncontested process. Indeed, 
many social conflicts are about the limits of commodification, for instance in the case of the 
private provision of water, but also organ transplants, prostitution, and illegal drugs (Zelizer 
1994). Nevertheless, it is fair to state that over the past 200 years we have observed an expansion 
of commodity relations at the expense of householding and reciprocity as forms of distributing 
of goods and services. 
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potential purchaser.14 Hence one can see how the macrodevelopment of the expansive-
ness of capitalism again depends on the level of social interaction with regard to actors’ 
expectations.15 
If economies can grow only if there is an actual demand for more and more new prod-
ucts and if, at the same time, this demand cannot simply be thought of as “natural,” the 
expansiveness of capitalism depends not only on the supply side, but also on the cre-
ation of expectations on the part of potential buyers, which make purchasing the goods 
offered appear worthwhile to them. Looking at consumption, for the economy to grow, 
people must value the consumption of more goods more highly than the alternative 
of working less. But how is this attitude created and maintained? One of the puzzles of 
the dynamics of contemporary capitalist economies is why new products keep finding 
demand even though widespread affluence would indicate that consumers’ needs might 
have already been met. 
Viewed from a micro perspective, commodification is based on the assignment of eco-
nomic value to goods and services. Economic sociology has an important focus on the 
investigation of processes of valuation through which expectations about the perfor-
mance of goods are created (Beckert/Aspers 2011; Karpik 2010; Stark 2009). However, 
it rarely connects the insights won on the micro level to an understanding of the opera-
tion of capitalism as an economic system (Streeck 2012:11). 
Analytically, one can distinguish between three different types of performance of goods 
(Beckert 2011b). The performance can be physical when it makes a difference in the ma-
terial world. An example would be a house that provides shelter from the weather, a car 
that takes me from point A to point B, or the electricity a factory purchases to power its 
production.16 An increasing number of goods in affluent consumer societies, however, 
are not – or are only partly – valued for their physical performance alone. Instead, the 
performance of such products hinges on two other forms of value which can be called 
14 A striking example of this is provided in a recent paper by Zsuzsanna Vargha (2013, forthcom-
ing) in which she shows how the value of home loan contracts in Hungary is constructed in the 
interaction between sales agent and customer.
15 I concentrate in this section on consumer demand. The contingency of expectations regard-
ing value applies, however, also to financial products and to labor markets. In labor market 
economics the contingency of value has been investigated in efficiency wage theories which 
proceed from the uncertainty of whether employees will indeed apply their labor power to the 
benefit of the firm (Akerlof 1984; Berger 1995). Work in the économie des conventions (Eymard-
Duvernay/Marchal 1997; Gerlach 2012) shows the social processes through which expectations 
about the productivity of a candidate are formed in the recruitment process.
16 In the case of the physical performance of goods, the desire to own them seems to be natural. 
However, the assessment of the functional qualities of goods depends on knowing how to use 
them and on classification systems which distinguish between product qualities. Such classifica-
tion systems are social preconditions for expectations regarding the performance of a product. 
An anonymous market for cotton and cotton futures can emerge only when a classificatory 
system distinguishing the different qualities of cotton is in place (Caliskan 2007).
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“positional value” and “imaginative value” (Beckert 2011b). Both these forms of value 
refer to symbolic qualities that are created as part of cultural development and main-
tained through communicative processes and market devices. This implies that there is 
a “management of value” just as there is a “management of confidence” in the field of 
financial investments.
Positional value comes about because third parties value the commodity and position 
the owner of it in a desired position in the social space. I do not need to like Andy 
Warhol, but having one of his paintings in my apartment certainly impresses my visi-
tors. The motivation for purchasing the painting hinges on aspirations of being recog-
nized as a member of a certain community, in other words, on the social recognition 
the owner experiences. In the case of “imaginative value” the social surroundings are 
left out: my social surroundings may or may not like the Andy Warhol painting, but I 
value qualities “in” it that I ascribe symbolically to it.17 Here the worth of objects stems 
from transcendental ideals and values which become symbolically represented by the 
object. In her work on life insurance Viviana Zelizer (1979) gave an example of how 
imaginative value is created: life insurance could become a marketable product in the 
nineteenth century only when it was interpreted as an expression of the family respon-
sibility of the deceased. The product became a symbolic representation of the value of 
responsibility.18 
Contemporary economies are increasingly built around expectations regarding the sym-
bolic performance of goods. Markets for cars, tourism, computers, antiques, wine, lotter-
ies, real estate, fair-trade products, or fashion cannot be understood without reference to 
contingent expectations regarding the positional and imaginative performance offered 
by the goods. Proceeding from this perspective, however, makes it at the same time utter-
ly clear that the expansion of capitalist growth will continue to be problematic because 
of the contingent character of wants: the greatest threat to the car industry would stem 
from consumers losing interest in the symbolic qualities associated with cars.
The symbolic dimensions of goods create an attraction to them but also exert a struc-
tural force to exercise demand beyond functional necessity because social status posi-
tions hinge on the possession of these goods. For advanced economies to grow, however, 
17 To avoid a possible misunderstanding: this does not imply that imaginative value is purely in-
dividual. To the contrary, the preferences are rooted culturally and socially. However, the value 
does not necessarily emerge from calculated effects of positioning the owner in a certain posi-
tion in social space. 
18 Another example of imaginative value is the emergence of a market for whale watching (Law-
rence/Phillips 2004). Paying money to board a ship which sails off the coast for the sole purpose 
of observing whales swimming in the ocean would have appeared an act of utter madness to any 
contemporary of Herman Melville. Only through a cultural shift of symbolic connotations of 
whales as wild creatures to be feared to symbolic representations of freedom and intact nature 
– or from “Moby Dick” to “Free Willy” – could whale watching become a commodity, although 
its value is purely symbolic. Observing whales makes it possible to “experience” a transcendent 
value.
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it is not only necessary that objects be bought for their symbolic performance. Produc-
ers will only be able to keep selling new products if their symbolic value is dynamic, 
that is, if the value of a purchased product can diminish in order to create a desire for 
new purchases. The dynamics of the symbolic value of goods can be explained by two 
mechanisms. The first is based on the desire for social distinction, described by Georg 
Simmel ([1908]1919) to explain fashion and referring to the positional value of goods. 
If the purpose of consumption is to signal higher social status through the exclusivity 
and novelty of the products consumed, goods lose value once they are diffused into the 
mainstream. This means that ever-novel objects must be defined as symbolic represen-
tations of distinction, a mechanism that finds expression in continuous processes of 
symbolic valuation and devaluation. The second mechanism has its root in the process 
of appropriation itself, which leads to a devaluation of the acquired object. The desire 
for goods, being built upon mental images, may differ considerably from reality and 
may hence be the source of disappointment once the object is purchased (Hirschman 
1982: 12). This relationship between appropriation and devaluation was also examined 
by Simmel when he analyzed value as emerging from a distance between subject and 
object: 
We desire objects … in terms of [their] distance as something not-yet-enjoyed, the subjective 
aspect of this condition being desire. … The object thus formed, which is characterized by its 
separation from the subject, who at the same time establishes it and seeks to overcome it by his 
desire, is for us a value. The moment of enjoyment itself, when the separation of subject and 
object is effaced, consumes the value. Value is only reinstated as contrast, as an object separated 
from the subject. (Simmel [1978]2004: 66)
The two mechanisms indicate that – as in the case of credit – the “management of value” 
becomes a prime task on which the growth of capitalist economies hinges. Enormous 
efforts are necessary to create, maintain, and shift the symbolic qualities of goods. These 
efforts lead to the emergence of a huge industry in its own right. The marketing de-
partments of firms and firms specializing in marketing services adjust their marketing 
mix in an attempt to shape consumers’ expectations. In the historical development of 
capitalism marketing costs have become an increasing large part of the cost schedule of 
firms. The management of value, however, also takes place through “judgment devices” 
(Karpik 2010) produced and applied mostly by intermediaries in the field. Critics, guide 
books, product rankings, product tests, opinion leaders, certificates of authenticity or 
fair-trade labels, all shape consumer expectations with regard to the functional and 
symbolic qualities of goods. In addition, consumers themselves, through their defini-
tions of what is “hip” and what is “out” contribute to the dynamics of symbolic value. 
Only based on the promises created through the communication of (symbolic) quali-
ties do actors form expectations with regard to goods conducive to the creation of de-
mand and to economic growth. 
At the same time, actors’ expectations are the subject of competitive struggles between 
interested actors who attempt to get customers attached to their products and to de-
tach them from their competitors’ products (Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 2002). This is 
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again similar to the strategic interventions of interested actors in the management of 
confidence on financial markets. The expectations creating the symbolic value of goods 
are contingent and fragile because they are contested in such competitive struggles but 
also because they are not based in an essential quality of the product. There is no “natu-
ral need” for their demand. Value is created through the social and cultural definitions 
of the performance of the good. Economic growth is therefore understandable only as 
a social and cultural process and not as being based on “the necessaries of life” (Smith 
[1776]1976: 368). 
Creativity (Innovation)
Undoubtedly, innovations are a further cornerstone of the uniqueness of capitalist dy-
namics (Baumol 2002; Deutschmann 2009; Schumpeter 1912). Through innovation 
new factor combinations are introduced into the market which – if successful – satisfy 
previously unattended needs, create new needs, or enhance efficiency in the production 
process. Like credit and commodification, innovations are, looked at from the perspec-
tive of social interaction, based on actors’ contingent expectations. I want to refer to 
these expectations as imaginaries of the future. As in the case of the other two elements, 
the management of expectations plays an important part in innovation processes. It 
takes the form of a “management of imaginaries.”
The central role of imaginaries in innovation was recognized by Joseph Schumpeter 
(1912). Schumpeter’s analysis sets out from the observation that new combinations ini-
tially exist only in the consciousness of the actor. While most actors are caught up in rou-
tines, some actors “with more acute intelligence and a more active imagination envisage 
countless new combinations” (ibid.: 163). Hence innovations begin with imaginaries 
that lead the entrepreneur to “adapt his economic activities accordingly” (Schumpeter 
1912: 165). The entrepreneur will, based on the imaginary of a new factor combination, 
change the value assessment of the goods offered in the market and change product 
demand which will lead to changes in relative prices. Hence it is a utopian vision at the 
outset, which shows a pretended future reality, that motivates innovative activity. In the 
contemporary economy the late Steve Jobs is the exemplification par excellence of the 
creation of successful innovations through the creation of imaginaries, captivating the 
computer industry and large consumer groups. 
Imaginaries are expectations that allow actors to move beyond inherited thought pat-
terns and categories by bringing them into an as-if world in which given reality is sur-
passed and a different one considered (Bronk 2009: 201; Tappenbeck 1999: 53). Schum-
peter insists that innovation is incompatible with the calculative behavior assumed 
by economic theory because innovations cannot be rationally deduced from existing 
knowledge. Instead, the imaginaries of economic actors motivate and guide an inher-
ently incalculable innovative process (see also Beckert 2002; Deutschmann 2008) based 
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on the belief in the imagined new combination as a “future present” (Esposito 2011). 
This implies that the expectations regarding novel factor combinations must neces-
sarily be contingent and helps to explain why it is possible to predict the expansion of 
capitalism without being able “to predict the actual direction of future logics” (Sewell 
2008: 523).
Schumpeter has rightly been criticized for providing an overly individualistic account 
of the motivation to engage in innovative activity. Entrepreneurs’ expectations must be 
understood much more as socially constituted. The “voicing of promises” which show 
the way to the future are in fact collective projections (van Lente/Rip 1998: 222). The 
utopian vision can be pursued successfully only if it is not considered to be purely the 
madness of an individual. That an imaginary of the future is shared collectively protects 
new ideas from disbelief (March 1995: 437).
Expectations regarding innovative activities have further social preconditions. “Capi-
talist entrepreneurs do not fall from heaven but can grow only in a particular struc-
tural, institutional, and cultural environment” (Deutschmann 2011: 4). Robert Merton 
(1957) showed that innovative activities are anchored in the normative structure of 
modern societies which value inner-worldly transcendence through success-seeking by 
risk taking. Another element of this environment is social inequality, without which 
there cannot be a motive to engage in activities that will lead to social rise. Secondly, it 
must in reality be possible to rise through entrepreneurial effort. Capitalism is histori-
cally unique also in being an economic formation which determines social status not by 
social origin but based on market success ascribed to effort. This holds true even if there 
are strong real barriers to social mobility. A motivation to engage in innovative activity 
can emerge only if the structural polarization of classes does not create expectations 
which assume that the barriers to upward mobility are individually insurmountable 
(Deutschmann 2011: 4). Here institutional, network, and cultural factors are important: 
the education system must be open to meritocratic principles, networks in the family 
or the (ethnic) community must be conducive to individual success-seeking (Portes/
Sensenbrenner 1993), and cultural or religious traditions must support entrepreneurial 
orientations (see Deutschmann 2011: 4f). Neither a completely egalitarian society nor 
a society that actually or legally blocks status mobility will be able to create the expecta-
tions that usher in entrepreneurial activity. To create beliefs in the possibility of status 
enhancement is a necessary condition of capitalist reproduction. Failure in that respect 
deprives capitalism of one of its central pillars of growth. 
Expectations in innovative processes are also subject to management of expectations, 
which takes the form of “management of imaginaries.” An example of this was provided 
by Sophie Mützel (2010) in a study investigating the innovation process in biotechnolo-
gy firms aiming to develop genetically engineered medication for treating breast cancer. 
In this highly uncertain environment the success of firms’ research strategies cannot be 
foreseen and hopes of successful product development are often disappointed. Actors 
try to influence the expectations of others – and the decisions following from them – 
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through the communication of stories providing accounts of which development strat-
egy they expect to succeed. The stories are imaginaries that send signals to competitors 
and the financial community. Hence, since decisions hinge on expectations, the ma-
nipulation of expectations becomes a means in the competitive struggle for resources 
for research and development. This is a power struggle about a dominant interpretation 
of how the “future present,” on which present decisions are based, will look.
Competition
Finally, competition is the fourth element of the dynamics of capitalism. In competi-
tive markets, superior performances are rewarded through profits made by those who 
prevail in the competitive struggle. The competitive force that gives capitalism its dyna-
mism stems, however, not only from the strong pull created by the prospect of gain for 
the winners, but also, and especially, from the push that competition institutionalizes 
for all market actors. Because competition licenses “depriving one’s peers of their liveli-
hood by outbidding them” (Streeck 2012: 6), competition forces firms and individuals 
to employ resources in places where they are expected to yield the largest return. 
Competitive markets are socially legitimated by the expectation that they lead to the cre-
ation of wealth in society (Hirschman 1986). Despite the costs involved for those who 
are ruined by competition, competition does increase overall welfare. For the actors in-
volved, competition on the one hand provides an institutional assurance that individual 
gain can be realized through outperforming others and, on the other, constitutes a risk 
that others can put them out of business by outbidding them. Pre-capitalist social for-
mations imposed strict limitations on competitive markets and restricted them to the 
margins of society in order to limit their destructive consequences for the stability of 
communities. It is only in the capitalist order that the fear stemming from competition 
has been brought to the center of society as the price to be paid for reaping the expected 
benefits (growth) stemming from the restless striving for superiority in the competitive 
struggle. The rise of capitalism in the nineteenth century is closely related to the lifting 
of restrictions on competition by banning guilds, reducing tariffs, and liberalizing mar-
ket access. (Braudel [1979]1985; Polanyi [1944]1957; Weber [1922]1978: 635ff).
From a micro perspective, the question arises of how expectations regarding opportu-
nities for profit are created in competitive markets. In its standard models, economic 
theory assumes perfect competition. Such a market situation, however, is profoundly 
unattractive for market participants because it eliminates the chance for profits beyond 
the “opportunity costs of equity capital provided by the owner of the firm” (Douma/
Schreuder [1991]2002: 30). Expectations of profit opportunities in markets depend, 
paradoxically, on the limitation of competition (Beckert 2009: 260). Through inno-
vation, product differentiation, increase in market share, vertical integration, or the 
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creation of entry or exit barriers, firms attempt to create niches of at least temporary 
monopoly in which they are shielded from competitive forces (Porter 1985; Knight 
[1921]1985). 
The strategies applied by firms to protect themselves from competition, and their stra-
tegic decisions in a given competitive situation, are the subject of industrial economics. 
In economic sociology they are debated by Harrison White (1981) in his analysis of 
markets as a set of differentiated firms with distinct identities.19 Product differentia-
tion produces niches with relative protection from competition. According to White, 
producers observe their competitors in the market in order to determine the niche in 
which they specialize. White’s model reflects the structural conditions under which 
positive expectations for investments can emerge based on the relative stability of the 
market structure. Both White’s model and industrial economics assume that observing 
the competitive situation allows firms to coordinate towards a particular equilibrium. 
Following game theory reasoning (Fudenberg/Tirole 1989), players can coordinate ex-
pectations based on pay-off matrices. If this holds true, expectations and strategies in 
games of competition would not be contingent but determined by a focal point. 
However, economists themselves have also cast severe doubts on this reasoning. Actors 
are frequently confronted with multiple equilibria, exposing them to decision situa-
tions in which they cannot anticipate the decisions of other actors and therefore depriv-
ing them of a basis for optimal decision-making (Elster 1986: 19). 
[E]ven apparently simple multi-period games of incomplete information often have multiple 
(perfect Bayesian Nash) equilibria that can be uncovered only by very sophisticated analysis. The 
assumption that boundedly rational humans can solve the much more complex games they face 
in real life seems to push the rationality assumption very far indeed. (Schmalensee 1988: 59)
Because actors lack the ground on which to form rational expectations, competition 
struggles are uncertain and market outcomes open. The indeterminacy of these situ-
ations makes the expectations an actor forms about a competitor’s reactions, the out-
come of contingent interpretations and power struggles over these interpretations. The 
indeterminacy creates space for “creative dissonance,” which is the source of profits 
beyond the opportunity costs for equity capital, but also the source of unpredictable 
losses due to a wrongly assessed situation (Ergen 2011; Stark 2009). This idea has been 
explored by David Stark (2009), who showed that a given situation in which actors hold 
the same information allows for the simultaneous existence of different evaluative an-
19 According to White, competition is a process that takes place through the mutual observation of 
the strategies through which competing firms position their product in the market. Each prod-
uct occupies a distinct niche and the positioning of any of them takes place through the attempt 
to find a not yet occupied niche in which the product finds demand but is differentiated from 
competing products. Hence markets are understood as stable relational role structures, and the 
reproduction of markets and the survival of the firms operating in them presuppose this struc-
turing of markets.
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gles. Entrepreneurship, Stark argues, “exploits the indeterminate situation” (Stark 2009: 
17). Each structuring of the market situation through the formation of expectations 
reduces uncertainty in decision-making but can be challenged by other profit-seek-
ing actors providing alternative interpretations on which they form new expectations 
(Beckert 1999; Deutschmann 2009).
Since expectations, once they become dominant, affect a strategic situation, the man-
agement of expectations also plays a crucial role in the development of strategies in com-
petitive markets. An example of this is provided in a study on the emergence of the 
American electricity industry by Yakubovich et al. (2005). The authors conclude that 
the economic outcomes of the pricing system introduced in the electricity industry at 
the turn to the twentieth century – a crucial feature in the competitive struggle between 
firms in the industry – were uncertain for the actors and that the system introduced 
prevailed because of “complex manipulations and exercises of power by leading indus-
try actors, who mobilized support through their personal networks and domination of 
industry trade associations” (Yakubovich/Granovetter/McGuire 2005: 581f). 
For a microsociology of competition, questions arise on exactly how firms form expec-
tations regarding the decisions of other firms, despite the indeterminacy of the situa-
tion, and on how they succeed in influencing other actors’ expectations in ways favor-
able to themselves. The underlying assumption is that competition is also cognitively 
structured through the interpretation of the game being played which at the same time 
constitutes it.
2 Conclusion
Political economists have recently returned forcefully to the topic of capitalism and 
its dynamics. Most of this research, however, says nothing about the microfoundation 
of the developments it observes. I have suggested here that economic sociology is well 
equipped to provide this microfoundation. When applied to the question of capitalism’s 
dynamics, the numerous sociological studies on trust, the constitution of value, innova-
tion, and competition that have been conducted in recent years contain insights that 
illuminate the emergence of economic macrophenomena from a perspective of social 
interaction and the social, political, and cultural contexts in which decisions are made.
To this end I have discussed four elements at the center of the capitalist economy: cred-
it, commodification, creativity (innovation), and competition. These elements I have 
called the four Cs of capitalism. My hypothesis is that capitalism can be understood 
from the perspective of actors as a system of “contingent expectations.” I use the notion 
of contingent expectations to show that decisions made under conditions of uncer-
tainty are the outcome of indeterminate interpretations of a given situation that reflect 
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the unpredictability of the future. The expectations are not rational in the sense of 
economic theory, nor do they transform uncertainty into risk. Rather they constitute 
beliefs in promises, in the performance of goods, in imaginaries of the future, and in 
the adequacy of strategies. These beliefs motivate decisions whose consequences are ul-
timately incalculable. While most research in the social sciences explains present action 
due to past occurrences, I argue here that it is the future which shapes the present – or, 
to be more precise: it is the images of the future which shape present decisions.
The dynamics of capitalism depend on the creation of expectations that make promises 
appear credible, goods desirable, imaginaries worth pursuing, and strategies plausible. 
By influencing macroeconomic outcomes, expectations provide a link between micro 
and macro levels of analysis. To enable the expansion in scope and complexity that has 
been characteristic of contemporary capitalist economies, societies needed to develop 
the cultural, political, and institutional prerequisites that allowed for highly unlikely ex-
pectations of perceived opportunities that stemmed from an engagement in uncertain 
market transactions. Societies also had to create a desire to pursue these opportunities 
and, where needed, structures that would enforce compliance. Expectations are shaped 
communicatively by actors in the field – firms, the state, market intermediaries, ad-
vocacy groups, etc. – and are based on institutional, cultural, and network structures. 
Crises are the immediate effect of sudden shifts in expectations.
Due to its impact on outcomes, the management of expectations is a pivotal element 
of capitalist development and the struggle for profit. Influencing the expectations of 
others and communicating expectations about the behavior of others means exercis-
ing social power in the economy. Given the contingency of expectations, it is not price 
information from markets that determines decisions, but rather a political game of 
negotiation on the interpretation of a situation.
Bringing contingent expectations to the center of the microfoundation of political 
economy treats “interests, preferences, and group identities as the product of endoge-
nous social processes” (DiMaggio 2002: 94). Social interaction in the economy is neither 
determined by rational calculation nor does it reflect decisions based on hard-wired 
structures in our brains, as behavioral economics suggests. Rather, it is a profoundly 
social, political, and cultural process. Rational-choice explanations are misguided be-
cause decisions affecting the future “cannot depend on strict mathematical expecta-
tion, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist” (Keynes [1936]1964: 
162f). Behavioral economics is unsuitable because it disregards the social foundations 
of expectations. Instead, economic dynamics should be explained based on a theory of 
expectations weighted by economic and political power. Anchoring a theory of the dy-
namics of capitalism to the theory of expectations sketched here could provide the basis 
for the much-desired link between political economy and economic sociology.
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